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 Strengths and limitations of theoretical explanations in psychology 
The current state of the arts in psychological science can be described as the end of an 
era of hunting and gathering empirical findings. Psychologists have been extremely 
successful and industrious during this period of empirical research. We believe that it is now 
time to focus more extensively on theoretical explanations. The pluralism of methods and the 
increasingly interdisciplinary nature of psychological research call for more refined and 
methodologically sound theoretical explanations that go beyond circular accounts and 
labeling-type interpretations expressed in ordinary language.  
In order to take this important next step, we need to specify the criteria that sound 
explanations should meet, to reveal the various reasons for why current theories often do not 
meet those criteria, and to exchange ideas about how current theoretical practice can be 
improved. This special section of the Journal “Perspectives on Psychological Science” 
contains five papers in which researchers from various sub-disciplines in psychology reflect 
on these issues. 
Theorizing is guided by data and can thus be biased by selectivity in the collection of 
data. Fiedler (this issue) argues that selectivity in data collection is omnipresent in 
psychological science. More often than not, hypotheses about what the data should look like 
are used to guide the selection of data that are used to test those hypotheses. Whereas the 
recent high-profile debate on “voodoo-correlations” revealed one instance of this practice in 
neuroscience, Fiedler reveals many other common instances of hypothesis-driven selectivity 
in data collection. Although selectivity in data collection does not necessarily invalidate the 
data as such, it is vital for scientific progress that the nature of the selectivity is made explicit 
and that data are collected across a wider range of situations. 
Selectivity in data collection is often linked to the concept of circularity. Hahn (this 
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issue) provides a highly insightful analysis of what it actually means to say that arguments, 
explanations, data analyses, and research methods are circular. Based on the analysis, she 
concludes that the problems of circularity should not be overstated. On the one hand, some 
types of circular arguments and explanations can improve scientific understanding. On the 
other hand, claims about circular data analysis and methods often do not refer to actual 
instances of circularity but are related more to a failure to make explicit selectivity in the 
manner in which data have been collected. 
Selectivity in the collection of data is exacerbated by the strong focus in 
psychological science on paradigm-specific methods and effects. As Meiser (this issue) 
correctly points out, research and theorizing often deals primarily with effects in one 
particular experimental paradigm. Importantly, selectivity in data selection leads to 
selectivity in theorizing. It narrows the universality of theories, renders it more difficult to 
discriminate between different theories, and hinders the search for mechanisms that operate 
in a variety of situations. Therefore, more attempts should be made to develop theories that 
try to explain behavior in a variety of paradigms and situations. 
The paper of Garcia-Marques and Ferreira (this issue) also deals with selectivity at 
the theoretical level. Many theories are built on a theoretical dichotomy, that is, on one of 
two complementing or opposing processes (e.g., implicit vs. explicit memory) or 
representations (e.g. modal vs. amodal representations). Because of the focus on a dichotomy, 
the models tend to be imprecise and thus flexible in their assumptions about the other types 
of processes or representations that are needed to provide a full account of behavior. As a 
result, various models become indistinguishable, leading to the abandonment of the 
theoretical dichotomy on which the models were built. For instance, given certain 
assumptions about how representations influence behavior, models that feature modal 
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representations can mimic the output of models with amodal representations and vice versa. 
Garcia-Marques and Ferreira call for more high-level theories that go beyond simple 
dichotomies and can be applied to a broader range of phenomena. However, they 
acknowledge that also high-level cognitive theories can be difficult to evaluate empirically. 
Nevertheless, theoretical progress can be achieved because experimental data put limits on 
the types of cognitive theories that can be put forward. This type of progress can be 
optimized by clearly separating data from the theories used to explain these data. 
De Houwer (this issue) also calls for a clear separation of the explanandum (that 
which needs to be explained) and the explanans (that which is used to explain). This 
important scientific principle is violated when an empirical effect (e.g., negative priming) is 
used as a proxy for a cognitive process (e.g., inhibition). He discusses different ways in 
which these violations can hamper scientific progress. In order to guard cognitive research 
against these violations, De Houwer proposes a functional-cognitive approach in which the 
cognitive approach is grafted on a functional approach. The functional approach aims to 
uncover the environmental causes of behavior and does so without referring to mental 
constructs. The aim of the cognitive approach is to uncover the mental processes that mediate 
the impact of the environment on behavior. The approaches are mutually supportive in that 
the functional approach provides the input for the cognitive approach whereas the cognitive 
approach can help organize and guide functional research. 
Although all contributors discuss problems in current scientific practice, they are also 
constructive in that they put forward possible solutions for these problems and discuss the 
boundaries of the problems they have identified. With regard to the latter point, an important 
message that emanates from the papers is the idea that the criteria used to judge the quality of 
research and theorizing depends on the goals of the researcher. For instance, selectivity in 
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data analysis, in the scope of theories, and in the constructs on which theories are built might 
hamper theory testing but promote the discovery of new empirical effects. It is probably 
because of the advantage for the goal of exploration that potentially problematic scientific 
practices such as selectivity in data analysis have been so popular in the recent era of hunting 
and gathering empirical findings. Rather than abandoning these practices completely and 
replacing them by the alternatives put forward by the contributors of this special section, one 
should become aware of their limitations and be open for alternatives that can overcome 
these limitations. We hope that this special section will help researchers to reflect on their 
scientific practice in this manner. 
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